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IDAHO--THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A MAN-
DATORY PERMIT SYSTEM AND DENIAL OF A
WATER USE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
There is not enough water in the West for all present
and foreseeable future demands in Western streams and other
sources of supply.1 In view of this fact the water resources
of the Western states must be utilized so as to attain a maxi-
mization of benefits. Unlike many of the Western states,
the present system for the appropriation of surface water
in Idaho does not facilitate the maximization of water use.
There have been writers who have contended that the
maximization of the surface waters of Idaho can not be
attained because of the Constitutional provisions relating to
the appropriation of water.2 It is the purpose of this paper
to analyze the development and the present status of Idaho's
water appropriation system, to consider the constitutional
obstacles, and propose a constitutional plan for the maximi-
zation of the state's presently unappropriated water.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT STATUS OF
IDAHO'S APPROPRIATION SYSTEM
Article 15, section 3 of Idaho's Constitution provides that
the right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters
of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied,
except that the state may regulate and limit the use of water
for power purposes. In light of this constitutional provision
and earlier territorial legislation a water appropriation could
be made by anyone who diverted water and applied it to a
beneficial use. In 1903 the state enacted a comprehensive
statute which repealed the earlier provisions relating to post-
ing and recording notices of appropriation, and provided for
appropriating water by first applying to the state engineer
for a permit to do so.' The 1903 act is still in existence and
is part of the present water law in Idaho.4
1. Trelease, Desirable Revision Of Western Water Law, Papers of the WESTERN
RESOURCE CONFERENCE, 203 (1959).
2. Harvey, A Mandatory Permit System For The Acquisition of Water Rights
In Idaho, 2 IDAHO L. REv. 42 (1965).
3. Hutchins, The Idaho Law of Water Rights, 5 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 8 (1968).
4. IDAHO CODE §§ 42-201 to 225 (1948).
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Even though the 1903 statute seemed to require a manda-
tory permit,' and gave the state engineer power to deny a
permit if certain procedures were not complied with in filing,
the Idaho Court held that the statutory method of appropria-
tion was not the exclusive method of receiving the right to use
water.' In 1913 the Court clearly stated the effect of an
earlier opinion:
Under the laws of this State there are two meth-
ods of acquiring water rights: One is to follow the
statutory procedure and file an application for water
with the state engineer, . . . the other is to divert
unappropriated water and apply it to a beneficial use
without making application to the state engineer.... 7
The only legal difference between the two methods of
appropriation is that the priority of the appropriation dates
from the issuance of the permit under the "statutory method"
where as under the "diversion to beneficial use" method the
priority dates from the application of the water to a bene-
ficial use.8
In 1963 Idaho enacted a comprehensive ground water
code.' The code, which includes all water under the surface
of the ground," provides that the only way ground water
may be appropriated is by application for a permit." Thus
the act establishes a mandatory permit system for appropria-
tion of ground water, putting an end to the common law
method of diversion and application to a beneficial use.
The state engineer under the code, has the power, "to
control the appropriation and use of ground water . . . and
to do all things reasonably necessary or appropriate to
protect the people of the state from depletion of ground
water resources contrary to the public policy." 2
Thus, with regard to ground water Idaho has the ability
to maximize the utilization of the state's water resources.
5. IDAHO CODE §§ 42-201, 42-202 (1948).
6. Nielson v. Parker, 19 Idaho 727, 115 P. 488 (1911).
7. Crane Falls Power and Irrigation Co. v. Snake River Irrigation Co., 24
Idaho 63, 133 P. 655 (1913).
8. Id. at 661.
9. IDAHO CODE §§ 42-226 to 239 (Supp. 1967).
10. IDAHO CODE § 42-230 (Supp. 1967).
11 IDAHO CODE § 42-229 (Supp. 1967).
12. IDAHO CODE § 42-231 (Supp. 1967).
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Because the state requires a permit to use ground water, and
the permit may be denied to protect the public interest the
state can authorize only those uses which will tend to maximize
the state's water resources. The Idaho court has recently
upheld the ground water code in a case where the state engi-
neer denied a permit in the public interest."
However, the state presently does not maximize the use
of its surface water because there is no mandatory permit
system, and the state engineer does not have the power to
deny a use of water to protect the public interest.
II. THE NEED FOR, AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
A MANDATORY PERMIT SYSTEM FoR SURFACE WATER
A. The Need For a Mandatory Permit System
The Idaho permit system requires the applicant to set
forth in his request for a permit, his name, address, source of
water supply, nature of the proposed use, location of the diver-
sion, the amount of water to be diverted, etc. 4 The state
engineer under a mandatory permit system, would have this
information on every appropriation in the state. With such
information the engineer could quickly determine the priority
of any use, the amount of water allowed to be diverted, etc.
The state engineer could, with permit records, determine
the amount of water appropriated from any source of supply.
With information on the total amount of water of the source
he could determine the amount available for appropriation.
"In Idaho today it is impossible for the state engineer to
estimate satisfactorily the amount of water left for appro-
priation."" Without accurate information on unappropri-
ated water the state does not know whether it is maximizing
the use of the water. Nor will investment in large projects be
encouraged if there is not accurate information on available
water. Also under a permissive system rather than a manda-
tory one, the protection of an appropriator's rights may
require needless expensive litigation to establish his priority."
13. State ex rel. Tappan v. Smith, 92 Idaho 451, 444 P.2d 412, 417 (1968).
14. IDAHO CoDE § 42-202 (1948).
15. Harvey, A Mandatory Permit System For The Acquisition Of Water Rights
In Idaho, supra note 2.
16. Id. at 44.
1969
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B. The Constitutionality of a Mandatory Permit System
The first Idaho decision which directly concerned itself
with the seemingly mandatory permit language of the 1903
statute 7 was Nielson v. Parker." The Court did state: "We
should not lose sight of the provisions of section 3 article 15,
of the Constitution, which prescribes that: 'The right to
divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial use shall never be denied.' "',
However, the Court in holding that the 1903 statute did not
establish a mandatory permit system based their conclusion
on the legislative intent rather than on Article 15, section 3
of the Idaho Constitution. The Court held: "It has never
been the intention, so far as we are advised, of the legislature
to cut off the right of an appropriator and user of water
may acquire by actual diversion of the water and its appli-
cation to beneficial use.""
It is Harvey's 2 contention based on cases prior and sub-
sequent to Nielson:
That Idaho can legally have a mandatory permit
system of appropriation. The decisions holding that
the Idaho system is permissive rather than exclusive
or mandatory rests upon statutory construction.
Thus the Constitutional obstacles previously thought
to be standing in the way of adoption by Idaho of a
mandatory system are illusionary and based on an
inaccurate reading of the case law.22
A mandatory permit system in and of itself, is not a
method of denying the right to divert water. The purpose of
such a system is to provide information to the state engineer
so that the state has records of all appropriations.
17. IDAr-O CODE § 42-202 provides that ". any person, association or corpora-
tion hereafter intending to acquire the right to the beneficial use of the
waters of any natural streams, springs or seepage waters, or lakes or other
public waters in the state of Idaho, shall, before commencing the construc-
tion, enlargement or extension or change in the point of diversion of the
ditch, canal, or other distributing works, or performing and work in con-
nection with said construction or proposed appropriation of the diversion
of any waters into a natural channel, make application to the department
of reclamation for a permit to make such appropriation."
18. Nielson v. Parker, supra note 6.
19. Id. at 489.
20. Id. at 490.
21. Harvey, A Mandatory Permit System For The Acquisition Of Water Rights
In Idaho, supra note 2.
22. Id. at 56.
Vol. IV
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Thus it would appear that the Idaho court in holding that
the 1903 statute did not establish a mandatory permit system
based their decision on the legislative intent rather than on
constitutional grounds. Secondly, such a constitutional objec-
tion would not be made to new legislation creating a manda-
tory permit system. Thus if the legislature acts, some of the
problem under the present system of surface water appro-
priation system will be eliminated.
III. PuBuc INTEREST AND MAXIMIZATION
A second problem with Idaho water law, even assuming
that a mandatory permit system is constitutional and is
adopted, is that the state can still not get maximum utilization
from their water resources if the engineer is required to give
a permit to everyone. Thus the state engineer should have
the authority to deny a permit if the water will not be used
in the public interest and promote the public welfare.
A. The Need for Maximization in the Public Interest
If we start out with the assumption that there is plenty
of water, then the question of maximum utilization is not
quite so serious. It would be at best an academic exercise
spending much time considering the maximization of a re-
source with an unlimited supply. However, because "there
is not enough water in the West for all present and foresee-
able future demands in the Western streams and other sources
of supply,"" we are dealing with public resource of limited
supply and maximum utilization becomes vitally important.
The first prerequisite of a model state system of water
law is that it should encourage, or at least not deter, maxi-
mum development of the state's water resources.24 Under
Idaho's present surface water system, the state does not
meet the first prerequisite of a model system. As long as
the state allows anyone who can put water to a use, which
need only benefit the appropriator, the state does not neces-
sarily receive a maximum development of its water resources.
23. Trelease, Desirable Revision Of Western Water Law, supra note 1.
24. Trelease, A Model State Water Code For River Basin Development, 22,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 301, 303 (1957).
1969
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When we speak of maximum development it should be
kept in mind that "what is to be maximized is welfare from
water use, not water use in itself." 5 If the state concerns
itself with trying to solely maximize water use, welfare as
well as development would be stifled. No matter how bene-
ficial a project might be to the public welfare, there could
always be a use suggested that could come closer to maximiz-
ing water use itself. What the state should be concerned with
is that between alternative projects, or uses, the project
selected will be the one that most nearly maximizes public
welfare, rather than concerning itself with whether there has
been a maximum utilization of the water:
An ideal system of water law should give pro-
tection to two types of public interests-the interest
in the protection against exploitation and waste of
water resources including the interest in obtaining
optimum development and seeing that water is put
to the best possible use; as well as the interest held
collectively by members of the public in such uses of
water as navigation, fishing, and recreation. 6
Thus in determining the maximization of utilization of
water the state must not only consider whether water is being
fully utilized, and whether the economic benefits flowing
from the utilization are "maximized"; but also the state must
consider whether the water resources benefit the public with
regard to non-economic demands. A balance between the two
will be the optimum level, thus insuring public interest.
The concept of public interest in water resource devel-
opment is not a new concept. The earliest system requiring
a beneficial use was probably the first attempt to regulate
the public's water to see that it was put to a use which would
at least not waste the resource. As early as 1903 Elwood
Mead 7 was contending that under a system of unregulated
prior appropriation the public, the real owner of the re-
source, was not receiving any benefits."
25. Trelease, Policies For Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces and
Public Regulation, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 4 (1965).
26. Id. at 39.
27. E. MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS, (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1903).
28. Id.
Vol. IV
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Mead could see that the system of unregulated appro-
priation, which was divorced from the public interest, neces-
sarily would lead to increased control exercised by the public
authorities.2" It was his contention that public supervision
was manifest in the arid states and it seemed only a question
of time when the doctrine of prior appropriation would give
way to complete public supervision."
Today the movement toward more public supervision is
apparent in the suggestion that "[State] Agencies represent-
ing all classes of water users should take over the power to
issue permits and make effective use of it by issuing permits
only for those projects which will fit into the master plan
for optimum beneficial use of the water, and reserve water
from projects that do not accord with the master plan." 1
To some greater or lesser extent many Western states 2
have statutes that allow the state engineer to deny permits
if the proposed use is not consistent with public interest.
B. Can Idaho by Legislation Give the State Engineer
Such Power
Article 15, section 3 provides "the right to divert and
appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream
to beneficial use, shall never be denied," except for power
purposes. If the state engineer is given the authority to deny
permits in the public interest, it would appear that such
authority would be a violation of Article 15, section 3. How-
ever, the state engineer has such authority with regard to
ground water.33 It would appear that if the state engineer
has such authority with respect to ground water he could
have like authority regarding surface water.
The key provision in Article 15, section 3 is "Natural
Stream." In most western states surface and underground
streams are subject to the same law on methods of appro-
29. Id. at 142.
30. Id.
31. Trelease, Desirable Revision Of Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 214.
32. For example, see, NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370 (1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-
5-6 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-1, 73-3-8 (1953); Wyo. STAT. § 41-203
(1957).
33. IDAHo CODE § 42-231 (Supp. 1967).
1969
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priation 4 Early Idaho cases make a distinction between
underground streams and percolating waters, holding that
underground streams are subject to the same means of appro-
priation as surface streams. 5 But in a later decision the court
held all ground waters are percolating, 6 and all ground
waters are subject to appropriation the same as surface
water. 7
Therefore the Idaho court has ruled that there are no
underground streams. The court stated that it would seem
impossible to establish one rule for ground water in relatively
stable condition and another rule for ground water in decided
motion."8 With such a holding it is quite apparent why the
ground water code need not comply with Article 15, section 3,
because the constitutional provision applies only to "Natural
Streams."
The Idaho court feels that Article 15, section 3 does pose
a definite limitation on the authority of the state engineer
as to the appropriation of surface water. In a 1964 case the
court applied Article 15, section 3 to the effect that a person
desiring to appropriate surface water could never be denied,
so long as there is unappropriated water and the appropria-
tor applies it to a beneficial use. 9
It appears that in holding the ground water code consti-
tutional the court did not need concern itself with Article 15,
section 3.4' Where as a surface water system which allows
the state engineer to deny a permit in the public interest
would not only come within the constitutional provision but
would be in conflict with it. It is Harvey's contention that
the Constitution:
Does seem to contain limitations as to the grounds
for which the state engineer can be empowered to
deny permits. Permits can constitutionally be denied
where there is no unappropriated water or where
the proposed use is not beneficial. However, an
34. For example, see, Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694
(1936); Verdugo Canyon Water Co. v. Verdugo, 152 Cal. 655, 93 P. 1021
(1908); Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926).
35. Public Util. Comm'n. v. Natatorium Co., 36 Idaho 287, 211 P. 533 (1922).
36. Hinton v. Little, 50 Idaho 371, 296 P. 582, 583 (1931).
37. Silkey v. Tiegs, 51 Idaho 344, 5 P.2d 1049 (1931).
38. Hinton v. Little, supra note 37.
39. Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179, 397 P.2d 761 (1964).
40. State ex rel. Tappan v. Smith, supra note 12.
Vol. IV
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amendment of the Idaho Constitution seems required
if the legislature wants to broaden the state engi-
neer's discretion and enable him to deny permits
where an appropriation would be against the public
interest."
C. Beneficial Use--A Constitutional Method to Provide
for Public Welfare
One area in which it does seem possible to expand the
state engineer's power in denying permits is by construing
an undesirable proposed use as a non-beneficial use.
Under both the constitutional"' and the statutory meth-
ods"3 of appropriating water, the appropriator must apply the
water to a beneficial use. A key question is what is a bene-
ficial use, and who is to determine whether a use is beneficial 1
The most common definition of beneficial use is that it
is a question of fact to be decided upon considering the facts
of each case." In early water law when water was plenti-
ful, a beneficial use was any use that would benefit an
appropriator.
As competition for water grew fiercer and as
the realization grew upon the courts and legislatures
that the allocation of water involved a problem in the
conservation of natural resources, new concepts
evolved, that each use must not only be beneficial
in the abstract sense, but must also be a reasonable
and economic use in the light of other demands for
the little remaining to be allocated. 5
Thus a use must not only be embraced within the general
class of uses held to be beneficial, i.e., only of benefit to the
appropriator; but it must also be a reasonable and economic
use of the water supply."6
In an early decision the Idaho court stated: "A prior-
appropriator is only entitled to the water to the extent that
41. Harvey, A Mandatory Permit System For The Acquisition Of Water Rights
In Idaho, supra note 2, at 56.
42. Diversion and application to a beneficial use method.
43. Permit Method.
44. Denver v. Sheriff, 15 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
45. Trelease, The Concept Of Reasonable Beneficial Use In The Law Of Surface
Streams, 12 Wyo. L. Rav. 1, 16 (1957).
46. Id
1969 COMMENTS 495
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he has use for it when economically and reasonably used."' 7
In another early case the Idaho court stated that what "con-
stitutes a reasonable use of water is a question of fact, . . .
and depends upon the circumstances of each case, such as
the size of the stream, the number of consumers, the character
of the soil, the nature of the crops, and other like considera-
tions. "" The size of the stream, and the number of consumers
taken together will show how much water there is, and the
amount of water appropriated thus giving the amount of
water available to appropriate. In effect the court is saying
that reasonableness depends at least in part on how much
water there is available for appropriation; and secondly
whether the proposed use is economically sound in light of
other uses, i.e., the character of the soil, and the nature of
the crops. Thus if there is little water available and an
appropriator plans to use it on poor soil to raise crops that
are not needed, in light of other uses, the use may not be
beneficial.
Under such a definition of beneficial use the Idaho court
has moved a long way from simply saying that any case
which is beneficial to the appropriator is considered a bene-
ficial use in the law. The Idaho Court is not just considering
the interest of the appropriator, but is concerned with acquir-
ing the most benefit from available water supplies. It can't
be assumed that the Court has provided an optimum develop-
ment of the state's available supplies; however, through the
concept of beneficial use the Court has taken a step in that
direction. If the Court is willing to expand its concept of
beneficial use, under a mandatory permit system for surface
waters, the state engineer could exercise the same degree of
discretion that he would have if he could deny permits in
the public interest.
The determination of a beneficial use, in light of alter-
native uses can be aptly illustrated by Tanner v. Bacon,49 a
1943 Utah case, which has been described as the "sleeping
beauty of Western water law. "" An application for a permit
47. Washington State Sugar Co. v. Goodrich, 27 Idaho 26, 147 P. 1073, 1079(1915).
48. Beasley v. Engstrom, 31 Idaho 496, 168 P. 1145, 1146 (1917).
49. 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957.
50. Trelease, Desirable Revision Of Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 213.
Vol. IV
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was made for 100 second-feet of water to be used for the
generation of hydroelectric power. The project was feasible
from an engineering standpoint, and clearly would provide
some benefits. The Utah Water Storage Commission and the
Bureau of Reclamation had plans for a large multi-purpose
project, and even though they applied for a permit after
the power project, they were given priority.
The court was holding that the multi-purpose project was
a more beneficial use of the available water, promoting the
public welfare, and movement toward the maximization of
the states water resources.
In determining which project is a beneficial use the
court must not only consider the gross benefits, but must
consider the project cost, social costs, and opportunity costs
or foregone benefits.
For example, in the Tanner ease, considering the bene-
fits from the power project as being 10 and benefits from
the multi-purpose project as being 15, the project cost as
7 and 10 respectively, there will be adjusted gross benefits
of 3 from the power project and 5 from the multi-purpose
project. However, considering the benefits foregone as a
cost, (i.e., if the state allows one project they can't allow the
other, thus the adjusted gross benefits of the project not
allowed become a cost of the one accepted) the adjusted gross
benefit of the power project 3, becomes a cost of the multi-
purpose project leaving a net benefit of 2 (5 minus 3) ; and
the adjusted gross benefit of the multi-purpose project, 5
becomes a cost of the power project leaving a net benefit
of -2, (3 minus 5).
Thus the power project is not a beneficial project and
should not be allowed a permit. But, if the power project
was the only proposed appropriator then there would be no
alternative cost, and the project would be allowed a permit
because it would be beneficial.
All courts have said that the wasting of waters can
never be a beneficial use. If an appropriator diverts waters
and wastes it there will be no beneficial use, thus no right
to use. The Idaho court has stated, "the policy of the law
COMIMENTS 4971969
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of this state is to secure the maximum use and benefit, and
the least wasteful use of it's water resources." 5 The question
is, then, what is a wasteful use.
In the Oregon case of In re Deschutes River 2 the court
stated that "an extravagant and wasteful application of water
even though a useful project, or the employment of water in
a non-beneficial enterprise, is not included in the term "use",
as contemplated by the law of waters.5"
The Oregon court felt that there is a waste of water when
it is applied in an extravagant manner even to a useful
project, or a use of water to a non-beneficial enterprise. The
Oregon court denied the use of forty second-feet of water
during the irrigation season to clean debris from a reservoir
and keep it out of electric turbines, although the benefit of
such a use to the appropriator was admitted. The court
pointed out that the quantity of water could otherwise be
used to irrigate 1600 acres of land. The court looked at
alternative uses and felt that the water could be better used
elsewhere, and declared the proposed plan as being wasteful
in light of the alternatives.
The Oregon court felt that the difference between a
waste of water and its economical use is only a matter of
degree.5 By considering the proposed uses in relation to
alternative uses the court or the state engineer can determine
whether the proposed use is wasteful. If the use is wasteful
then the right to use the water of the state can be denied,
as not being a beneficial use.
As can be seen the state, through its engineer, can control
the use of water to a large extent by the concept of beneficial
use. This is just another means of allocating water resources
in the public interest. The principle that is being applied is
beneficial use but the outcome is a move toward a more
optimum development of the states' water resources.
51. Poole v. Olaveson, 82 Idaho 496, 356 P.2d 61, 65 (1960).
52. In e Water Rights of Deschutes River and Tributaries, 124 Ore. 623, 286
P. 563 (1930).
53. Id. at 577.
54. Trelease, The Concept Of Reasonable Beneficial Use In The Law Of Surface
Streams, supra note 45.
55. In re Water Rights of Deschutes River and Tributaries, supra note 52, 577.
Vol. IV
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If the state engineer can use this system of determining
whether a use is beneficial, then he will be in effect allowed
to deny permits if he can show they are not an optimum use
of the available water resources. The engineer could have this
power without a constitutional amendment, because he would
be simply applying the Constitutional language of beneficial
use. His decision in this area would be subject to judicial
review, under the present permit system, and would probably
be so, even under a new mandatory system. However if the
court will back up the state engineer in his liberal application
of the beneficial use concept, the public welfare will be served.
IV. SUMTARY AND CONCLUSION
There are two basic problems with the dual system of
appropriating surface water in Idaho. First, the common law
method does not facilitate the recording of appropriations.
The lack of adequate records does not provide a workable
method for the state engineer to adequately administer the
waters of the state, and requires needless court suits among
appropriators for the determination of the validity, nature,
extent, and priority of their appropriations. The second
problem caused by the present system is that the state can
not regulate its water resources to provide for the maximiza-
tion of public welfare.
These two problems could be remedied by legislation pro-
viding for the establishment of a mandatory permit system,
and by allowing the state engineer to deny permits in the
public interest. The question with regard to this solution is
whether it is constitutional.
It appears that a mandatory permit system is consti-
tutional, and with the proper interpretation of "beneficial
use," the Idaho court could allow the state engineer to deny
permits in situations where there is not an optimum utiliza-
tion of water resources, or where the use would not provide
for the public interest. With such an interpretation of "bene-
ficial use" legislation providing the state engineer with such
powers could be declared constitutional. The concept of
"beneficial use" can be the key, opening a new era in maxi-
mization of water resources in Idaho. The Idaho Court has
1969 499
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taken some preliminary steps in expanding their definition
of "beneficial use" and a legislative directive in this area
may be the catalysis which enables Idaho to join many of her
sister states in providing water resource allocation in the
public interest.
WILLIAM L. CORBETT
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